October 25, 2017
Since August, the Rohingya, an ethnic minority in
Myanmar, has faced what a United Nations official called “a textbook example of
ethnic cleansing.”
Recent reports describe a campaign by Myanmar security
forces to drive the Rohingya from the country permanently. Hundreds of
thousands have fled to camps in neighboring Bangladesh, creating a new refugee
crisis.
This is exactly the type of atrocity that the United
Nations vowed to combat in 2005, when it asserted a “responsibility to protect”
civilian populations from genocidal violence. Yet, little has been done.
Why has “the responsibility to protect” failed, and can
the Rohingya be helped?
Responsibility to protect
The “responsibility to protect” doctrine resulted from
the humanitarian catastrophes of the 1990s: Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and
especially Rwanda. The world struggled to balance respect for state sovereignty
with the imperative to prevent the slaughter of civilians. In 2001, the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty issued a report
redefining the problem. It stated that states had primary responsibility to
protect their populations. But, if they could not or would not, then that duty
could be exercised by the international community.
This concept was affirmed by the United Nations at the
2005 World Summit. However, my research on the origins and implementation of
the responsibility to protect has demonstrated that this consensus was
superficial. Many states, including the United States and China, gave lip
service to a “responsibility to protect,” but were unwilling or unable to
implement it. The conditions under which the responsibility to protect could be
invoked remain deliberately ambiguous.
Words in action: Libya and Cote d'Ivoire
Despite this tepid support, in 2011, the United Nations
authorized two operations in countries where civilians were at risk.
In Cote d'Ivoire, United Nations peacekeeping forces
intervened to remove the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, who had lost an
election and was using the country’s security force to attack civilians in an
attempt to remain in power. U.N. forces helped oversee a political transition
and maintain security. This intervention was widely seen at the U.N. as a
success.
The other intervention was in Libya, after the country’s
leader Muammar Gaddafi threatened to slaughter those who opposed his regime.
The intervention – led by Britain, France and the United States – successfully
prevented Gaddafi’s slaughter of civilians. But it also led to the collapse of
his regime, his murder by rebel forces and continuing conflict in post-Gaddafi
Libya.
Failure to protect
Despite humanitarian crises in Syria, Yemen and South
Sudan, the responsibility to protect has not been used by the U.N. since 2011
to justify intervention. The Libya case helps to explain this: Once the
intervening forces helped overthrow Gaddafi, Russia and China declared that the
“responsibility to protect” was merely a pretext for the West to conduct regime
change. Those countries have repeatedly vetoed U.N. Security Council
resolutions on Syria.
Implementing the “responsibility to protect” faces other
challenges as well. One is that an intervention to protect civilians may
encounter armed resistance from those who are committing the atrocities, as
would likely be the case in Syria. A larger, more capable international
military force would be necessary to defeat them. Many states will be deterred
by the greater costs and risks of such an intervention.
Another challenge is that states and international
organizations have multiple goals and priorities. They may not wish to
jeopardize relations with the offending regime, or risk other national
interests, in order to stop violence. They may even help the regime that is
committing the atrocities, as the Russian government has done in Syria, to
advance those interests.
Finally, a successful intervention may lead to a costly
commitment to provide long-term security and relief – a “responsibility to
rebuild,” so to speak. For most states, these potential costs of intervention
far outweigh their willingness to act to save lives.
What can we do for the Rohingya?
All these challenges to implementing the responsibility
to protect are evident in the Rohingya case. Myanmar authorities have resisted
any international role in the crisis, raising the cost of potential
intervention. In any case, other states have little interest in taking action.
China is shielding Myanmar from pressure in the U.N. Security Council and is
trying to pull Myanmar into its sphere of influence. President Trump has not
made Myanmar a priority for American foreign policy. Russia, India and other
states prefer to work with the regime to further their own interests in the
region.
What can be done, then?
Economic and political sanctions against the Myanmar
military are a possibility. But without Chinese participation, they would have
limited effectiveness. Sanctions might also lead the Myanmar military to
reverse recent democratic reforms in the country.
An alternative would be for the United States and other
countries to sharply increase aid to Bangladesh, which is hosting the fleeing
Rohingya civilians. They might also consider accepting some Rohingya as
refugees. However, this could be problematic given the current debate on
refugees in the United States and many other countries.
In the longer term, diplomatic and financial pressure, as
well as the possibility of indictment for crimes against humanity, may convince
Myanmar’s military leaders to cease the ethnic cleansing and allow some
Rohingya to return. Unfortunately, no international cavalry is likely to ride
to the Rohingya’s rescue.
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