By Asia Times
Rohingya crackdown poses challenge for Indian
policy
Myanmar occupies a pivotal position in India’s strategic
calculus as New Delhi establishes a connection with Southeast Asia through its
“Look East” or “Act East” policy. The region has received the highest level of
patronage under different Indian administrations. This was intensified under
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his “Neighborhood First” policy with an active
focus on improving ties with India’s immediate neighbors.
This intensification hinges on three simple facts. First,
Myanmar constitutes the only physical gateway for India to connect with
Southeast Asia and beyond; second, Myanmar is seen as a key partner in the
fight to end insurgency in India’s northeast; and third, with access to Myanmar
and beyond, India can hold back the larger security implications emanating from
the presence of China in Southeast Asia.
Against this backdrop, India and Myanmar are preserving bilateral
relations, keeping in view the importance and significance of each other in the
changing globalized system. Their bilateral relations were expected to be
elevated further when the National League for Democracy (NLD), which had been
the main party of opposition in the decades of military rule, won a landslide
mandate to govern Myanmar in the historic election of 2015.
Many scholars and analysts initially claimed that the NLD
triumph meant victory for India over China, both of which had been Myanmar’s
longtime investment and trade partners. Many further articulated that with the
close connection that NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi had with India given her
childhood memories in that country, political ties between the two countries
could strengthen in areas including economic relations, connectivity and
defense cooperation.
In addition, it was stressed that the new Myanmar could
model itself on India by learning to establish strong institutions and the
principles of stable democracy.
All in all, the NLD victory was seen as presaging a
period of rigorous engagement and cooperation between Myanmar and India.
But just as it looked as though everything was going
smoothly between the neighbors, the Myanmar military (also known as Tatmadaw)
conducted a brutal crackdown on the Rohingya in northern Rakhine state after a
deadly coordinated attack by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army on August 25,
2017.
During the crackdown, soldiers were accused of atrocities
including torture and rape, driving more than 600,000 Rohingya across the
border into Bangladesh. This brought about a series of criticisms of Myanmar
and its leaders from various international organizations including the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, who described Myanmar’s actions as
a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”
“During this grave humanitarian crisis, when the
international community spoke with one voice in condemning the violence and
human-rights abuses committed by the Myanmar security forces, India was caught
in a dilemma”. It had to choose its priorities, but instead stayed
tight-lipped.
This silence by New Delhi emanates from the simple fact
that it was trying to engage with the new government of Myanmar and striving
not to repeat the mistakes it made in the 1990s when it heavily criticized the
military junta for its suppression of the democracy movement. India also felt
that amid the growing Chinese presence in many theaters including Southeast
Asia, upsetting the Myanmar government would be a strategic mistake.
As such, on his official trip to Myanmar, Prime Minister
Modi didn’t make any mention of the alleged atrocities against the Rohingya
Muslims. He instead praised the leaders of the state for countering the
violence and offered India-led development initiatives and projects in Rakhine
province.
Apart from the geo-strategic concern, there is a real
security interest in remaining tight-lipped on the Rohingya issue. To put it
simply, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal there are more than 90
insurgent groups operating on and across the porous borders of northeast India,
and in many cases they have conducted deadly cross-border terror activity,
including the June 4, 2015, Manipur ambush where more than 20 Indian security
personnel lost their lives.
Read also
South Asia Terrorism Portal: http://www.satp.org/
Manipur Ambush: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Manipur_ambush
Given this security situation; New Delhi fears that the
Northeast insurgent groups might get further leverage from Rohingya who have
staged similar kinds of attacks against Myanmar government forces. This would
make the security situation qualitatively different from anything in recent
decades and threaten the prospects of stability and development along the
India-Myanmar border.
China sees its chance
On the other hand, the Rohingya issue provided the
opportunity for a comeback by China, another longtime strategic player in
Myanmar that shares a significant border with the Southeast Asian country and
which until now, had shield away from involving itself in the internal politics
of another country.
In fact, until the Rohingya crisis flared up, Beijing had
been forced to pivot its position because of Myanmar’s recent democratization
and the gradual transformation of power. However, Beijing saw in the Rohingya
issue a unique opportunity to regain its lost opportunity in Myanmar and once
again bring the country into its orbit.
Playing this card, Beijing expressed support for the
Myanmar government on the Rohingya issue, including at the UN Security Council.
This support to Suu Kyi’s government in the face of widespread international
condemnation gave Beijing a chance to regain lost glory.
In another instance, China offered to play a mediator
role between Myanmar and Bangladesh and proposed a three-stage approach
suitable to the Suu Kyi government for ending the crisis. Faced with
international criticism, Suu Kyi and military commander Senior General Min Aung
Hlaing made a trip to Beijing to express their gratitude and seek support.
Beijing’s interest in throwing its weight behind Naypyidaw
stems from the simple fact that Myanmar occupies a pivotal part of China’s Belt
and Road Initiative, with Rakhine state being an important corridor. Rakhine
also has a significant importance for Beijing as it fulfills some of its
energy-security needs, giving a few Chinese-owned oil and gas Companies access
to the Kyaukpyu deep sea port project.
Apart from access to Rakhine’s own petroleum resources,
China can also secure an alternative energy route and reduce its dependence on
the Strait of Malacca. Moreover, by developing deep-water seaports and naval
bases in the area, China can secure an advantageous position in terms of
strategic influence in the Bay of Bengal, as well as getting access to the
wider Indian Ocean region and beyond.
And the Rohingya crisis mirrors a real internal security
concern to China. This stems from the separatist movement in China’s
far-western Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, whose predominant Uyghur Muslims
claim that the region is not a part of China but was illegally incorporated
into the People’s Republic in 1949. In the midst of the Rohingya crisis,
Beijing fears that Islamic radicalization might get even further infused,
within the Uyghur community leading to the development of more separatist
agitation in Xinjiang.
China vs India in Myanmar
Both India and China are competing in Myanmar. This
creates a worrying situation.
When we look at India’s position vis-a-vis Myanmar in the
immediate aftermath of the Rohingya crisis, New Delhi failed to come up with
any policy or solution apart from supporting the Myanmar leadership. New Delhi
was heavily criticized within the international community when it decided to
deport some Rohingya residing in India. All this raises questions the
responsibility and credibility of India’s status as a rising power when it
comes to resolving such crises in the future.
New Delhi’s inability to deal with the Rohingya issue
opened the gate for Beijing to capitalize on the Rohingya issue as a comeback
strategy in Myanmar. It has used all the resources and strategies at its
disposal in taking this relationship to new heights. And this time, the rise of
China in Myanmar is solely to be blamed on India.
Although it now looks evident that Beijing is playing a
long game in Myanmar, there is still some space for India to make amends. New
Delhi should craft a new Myanmar policy, while keeping in mind its own status
in the international community.
This can start from re-examining the Rohingya issue and
forming a constructive policy incorporating the ethos of democratic values
respecting human rights.