Author: David I Steinberg, Georgetown
University
Myanmar’s year was framed by the horrific
residues of 2017 — the flight from death and destruction of over 700,000 Muslim
Rohingya refugees, the largest tragic migration in modern Asian history, and
Myanmar’s denial of responsibility for the situation. The Rohingya exodus was
fuelled internally by the rise of religious ethno-nationalism, which continues
to hold back proposed solutions to the crisis and to the myriad of ethnic
rebellions that have been the state’s hallmark since independence in 1948. The
international repercussions of Myanmar’s ethnic cleansing and minority strife reach far beyond the Bay of
Bengal. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/10/07/myanmars-minority-strife/
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| Photo: Mir Sdq |
The Burmese armed forces (known as the
Tatmadaw) regard their sweep through Rohingya border townships as a justified
security response to what was in fact the attacks of a few, poorly armed
insurgents. The civilian administration under State Counsellor Aung San Suu
Kyi, fearful of inciting the wrath of the Tatmadaw and the possibility that it
may revert to a policy of pure control, continues to issue meaningless
platitudes in response to foreign concerns.
The complexities of the situation transcend a
clear-cut Muslim–Buddhist disparity. The Buddhist Rakhine (provincial) people
were conquered in 1784 and have been treated as second-class citizens by the
majority Buddhist Burmans ever since. They resent the outpouring of foreign
assistance to the Rohingya, claiming with considerable accuracy that they, the
Buddhists of Rakhine, are among the poorest people in Myanmar. They consider
themselves vulnerable, as do the other minorities that comprise one-third of
the total population of the state. But minorities vary. Those considered
taing-yin-tha (sons of the country) are automatic citizens, while the Rohingya
are denied that status. Even the use of the term “Rohingya” implies such ethnic
standing and thus is publicly decried by the government.
Although agreements have been reached between
Myanmar and Bangladesh on the question of repatriation (supposedly to begin
in 2019), this is more theatre than reality. Most Rohingya are fearful of
returning to what is, at best, second-class status — education, health
services, occupational choices and even internal travel are either denied or
restricted. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/03/24/the-rohingya-crisis-a-test-for-bangladesh-myanmar-relations/
The United Nations has called the exodus
‘genocide’. But it is ‘ethnic cleansing’, which by definition indicates that
the Myanmar government would be pleased if the Rohingya did not return.
Bangladesh is reluctant to have them remain. Some are advocating placing the
Rohingya on an island in the Bay of Bengal subject to the annual devastating
typhoons that blow in from the south.
Expressions of ethno-nationalism, both by the
Burman majority and the minorities themselves, produce both mythic histories
and an existential fear of the loss of identity. Although Buddhists make up 88
per cent of the country’s total population, some fear that this will not last
and the majority religion may soon be replaced by another, as happened in
Buddhism’s original home of India. The general population, clearly anti-Muslim
but more virulently anti-Rohingya, is strongly supportive of both the Tatmadaw
and the civilian administration’s position.
The previously strong Western support of the
‘quasi-civilian’ government of Aung San Suu Kyi has eroded. Her public
responses to the crisis indicate either an incomprehensible lack of understanding
of the atrocities that have occurred or her complicity in their internal
cover-up.
Criticism of the West by the Burmese state
has been widespread, and with it has come the resurgence of a closer
relationship with China. China effectively supports the Tatmadaw’s position on
the Rohingya, perhaps to take advantage of the space opened up by the United
States’ and the European Union’s declining domestic reputations. But perhaps
also to decry any pro-Muslim sentiment that could impinge on China’s own
attempts to quell Muslim discontent in its northwestern region of Xinjiang.
China also has major economic interests in
the Rakhine region — oil and gas pipelines, and the development of a major port
and industrial zone at Kyaukphyu (although these are not in Rohingya areas).
The Chinese Belt and Road initiative in Myanmar will further solidify China’s
national interests and its ties with Myanmar.
Although the Rohingya flight has dominated
the news, fighting in the north along the Chinese frontier by Kachin, Shan and
other minorities has stalled Suu Kyi’s efforts to resuscitate the country’s ‘Panglong peace process’ —
an attempt to solve the country’s long-festering Burman–minority relations.
China wants a settlement of the border region rebellions for its own economic
and political interests, but it does not want Western involvement or presence
on its periphery. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/30/myanmar-stumbling-over-non-secession/
The sterling possibilities for development in
Myanmar — a potential beacon of investment and tourism — have been severely
compromised by the Rohingya tragedy, and the state’s and Suu Kyi’s falling
reputations. For many in the West, Suu Kyi personified the country and its
democratic ideals. Although popular at home, her stellar international
reputation was built by the West. And it is now being destroyed by the West.
No solution is in sight. As the 2020
elections draw closer, there is no indication that either the Tatmadaw or Suu
Kyi and her National League for Democracy will temper their attitudes toward
the Rohingya. These attitudes reflect prevailing, albeit prejudiced, internal
winds in Myanmar.
David I Steinberg is Distinguished Professor
of Asian Studies Emeritus at Georgetown University.