By
Angshuman Choudhury*
AA’s
Hydrid Warfare
Watch: Local Roingyas are fleeing for heavy fighting between AA and Myanmar's Tatmadaw in southern Buthidaung. https://youtu.be/u9g6-570sK4
Over the
past four months, the Arakan Army (AA)—a Rakhine Ethnic Armed Organisation
(EAO)—has emerged as a formidable insurgent actor in western Myanmar,
particularly Chin and Rakhine states. The AA’s insurgency is based on a mix of
conventional and subversive tactics, aimed at gaining strategic dominance in
the short term and political-territorial control in the medium-to-long term.
Much of its future strategies and operational design will depend on its
relationship with the local population and the frequency and degree of the
military’s response.
Since it
began its southward expansion from Kachin State into Chin and northern Rakhine
States in 2014, the AA has gradually moved from employing a purely conventional
strategy of attacking Tatmadaw positions in remote frontlines to a more hybrid
strategy, entailing two distinct approaches.
First,
the AA has increased the frequency of its attacks on the military and has
expanded its conventional frontlines around Chin state’s Paletwa Township and
northern Rakhine state’s Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Rathedaung and Kyauktaw
Townships.
The key
aim of this approach is to challenge the Tatmadaw’s tactical dominance in the
region and gradually push it southwards. In this regard, the AA has achieved
significant strides in the past few months. For instance, it has carried out
fatal hits on the Tatmadaw’s rank-and-file, including on several high-ranking
officers. Recently, it captured a tactical command base of the military along
the Chin-Rakhine border and reportedly captured 11 soldiers.
On the
other hand, AA has itself suffered heavy casualties, outnumbering 2018’s tally
of 75 so far this year, as claimed by observers. This is not unexpected given
the overall strike superiority that the battle-hardened and heavily-armed
Tatmadaw enjoys over the relatively weaker AA.
Second,
since late last year, the AA has been targeting local administration and law
enforcement personnel in Rakhine state. It has particularly singled out the
state police, flagging them as collaborators of the Tatmadaw—the 4 January and
9 March attacks on police outposts being cases in point.
It has
also attempted landmine attacks and ambushes against government and police
convoys—including on Rakhine state’s chief minister—and carried out kidnappings
of local administrators and police chiefs. The AA’s intent here is to generate
fear and anxiety amongst those whom the group believes are directly working
with the military or providing political sanction to its operations.
This
two-front strategy, which is duly backed by a swelling cadre base, stable supply
lines, and increasing popular support amongst the local Rakhine populace
indicates not just a high level of tactical sophistication, but also an
ambitious strategy to upend the state’s control over Rakhine state.
This can
have two distinct outcomes that would cumulatively allow the AA to gain
leverage at the negotiating table: they weaken the state’s credibility as a
security provider, and increase the Tatmadaw’s costs of fighting at the
conventional frontlines. By staging attacks on softer targets, the AA also
hopes to balance the force asymmetry between them and the Tatmadaw.
Long-term
Strategies
While the
AA has not exhibited any signs of establishing a parallel government in Rakhine
state as yet, it has indicated its desire to establish some permanent force
presence.
Recently,
a statement purportedly from the AA outlining a proposed timeline for Arakanese
statehood went viral on the Internet. The AA categorically denied this, and
claimed that they only wanted to “set up a base” in Rakhine state, asserting
that “only the Arakan Army can assume responsibility for the security, peace
and development of the Arakanese people” and that the AA was “taking
responsibility in Rakhine State.”
It is
clear that the AA wants to break the Tatmadaw’s hegemony as a legitimate
security actor in Rakhine state and establish itself as a security guarantor
for the local people, much like the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Shan state.
While this does not directly entail any political mandate, it is inevitable
that the AA would begin to command political influence in the longer term,
especially given its broad influence over the Rakhine nationalist discourse and
popular narratives at the moment.
Furthermore,
it is crucial to note that the AA draws a fair share of its finances from the
local population, particularly the Arakanese business elite and expatriate
community. This means a local conflict economy has already emerged with
entrenched groups investing in a group in which they seem to have much
confidence. This will help the AA influence Rakhine politics in decisive ways
and embed itself in local political structures, which it can use in the long
term to assert permanent political influence.
Will the
Clashes End?
For now,
it appears that if the Tatmadaw continues its ground-and-air offensives and use
of arbitrary force against Rakhine civilians, the AA is unlikely to back down.
To compound the situation, the AA’s strategic allies from the Northern Alliance
may join the battle, if the recent statement to this tune by the Shan state
based Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) is any indication.
Yet, an
interceding political agreement might bring some temporary ease. The AA
recently participated in informal talks with the union government in Naypyitaw
alongside other non-ceasefire EAOs from the north, following which a five-point
agreement on reducing clashes and meeting every two months was signed. On this,
an AA spokesperson said that clashes might reduce if all parties respect this agreement.
At the
same time, according to the AA spokesperson, the Tatmadaw and the AA clashed 20
times after the talks, following renewed offensives by the military. The AA,
which remains well-financed and well-armed for now, has also maintained its
offensive posture, as the 23-25 March attacks on Tatmadaw columns in Rathedaung
and Kyauktaw show. Thus, it is too early to say if the clashes would subside
anytime soon.
Source: https://t.co/CJs1dqhdxF
*Angshuman
Choudhury, Senior Researcher, and Coordinator, Southeast Asia Research Programme
(SEARP)