As the
latest Panglong conference opens today, civil conflicts in other countries show
the common patterns and pitfalls on the path to a successful and sustainable
peace process.
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| A performance during the opening ceremony of the first 21st Century Panglong Conference in Nay Pyi Taw, August 2016. (Theint Mon Soe aka J | Frontier) |
By JOHN PAUL
LEDERACH,
STEPHEN GRAY &
MADHAV JOSHI
FRONTIER
May 24, 2017
The 21st Century
Panglong Conference represents an important milestone in Myanmar's long march
to peace. But it is only one step in a much longer process to end to the
violence that has long limited this country's great potential.
The pathway forward
is outlined in a framework for political dialog that has been negotiated
following 2015's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. This framework is geared to
eventually produce a Union Peace Accord — a comprehensive peace agreement —
which for many is linked to the need to develop a mutually agreeable
constitution and a federal democratic union.
Based on global
experience, comprehensive peace agreements take several years to negotiate and
several more to fully implement, as the stakeholders navigate through multiple
phases, complexities, and setbacks. The length of time that will likely be
required to reach a sustainable end to the country's conflicts will provide
little consolation to the people, soldiers and civilians alike, who continue to
suffer its immediate burden.
Some comfort might
be taken, however, from international experience of the enormous benefits that
accrue when countries negotiate and fully implement comprehensive peace
agreements to end civil conflicts.
The Kroc Institute
at the University of Notre Dame in the United States maintains a database of
all comprehensive peace agreements negotiated since 1989. Analysis of these
agreements has been used to support peace process negotiations and
implementation in multiple peace processes globally, most notably in Colombia,
where Kroc is an official partner in monitoring the implementation of 2016's
comprehensive peace agreement.
It is undeniable
that Myanmar's challenges are unique, and will require novel peacebuilding
approaches. Yet every country is unique, and despite that, there are common
patterns, pitfalls, and priorities that can be reviewed to generate options and
strategies for policy makers.
The value
of negotiated settlements
In deciding between
peace talks and military operations, Myanmar's leaders are already facing a
critical question: can we genuinely resolve our differences through
negotiation? The international answer to this question is unequivocal. In the
31 countries that have signed and fully implemented comprehensive peace
agreements since 1989, 84 percent have resisted a return to armed conflict.
In contrast,
military strategies — whereby one side tries to defeat the other or pressure
them to the negotiating table through the use of force — are rarely effective.
A common pattern is that groups can be defeated temporarily, but return later,
sometimes under new names or with different personnel.
This pattern has
played out multiple times in Myanmar, including for example when the Myanmar
National Democratic Alliance Army was ousted from the territory it held in
north eastern Shan State in 2009, only to return in 2015, since giving rise to
some of the most intense armed conflict that the country has seen in recent
memory.
Internationally
speaking, defeating groups militarily is less likely when there are multiple
opposition forces within a country. Since 1989, no national army has defeated
more than two internal opposition groups that it is fighting simultaneously.
Myanmar has up to 21 ethnic armed organisations, depending upon who is counting,
and no less than five of these remain engaged in active conflict.
Ending a conflict by
military means is also unlikely when groups have been fighting for a long time.
In international experience since 1989, the likelihood of a military solution
to conflict drops to 25 percent after one year, or 10 percent after three
years. In contrast, most of Myanmar's armed resistance movements have existed
for more than half a century.
Deciding between a
military or political strategy to end conflict is not a simple either/or
choice. Violence often can and does continue alongside negotiation processes.
But in setting its sights on a comprehensive peace agreement, through the
Panglong conferences and all the hard work that goes on in between, Myanmar is
giving itself a fighting chance to achieve a durable peace.
Towards a
Union Accord
The second critical
challenge facing the country is moving beyond security-focused agreements.
Myanmar has a deep history of security agreements, but these have proven
insufficient in themselves to end conflict sustainably. Though most of these
were never on paper or publicised, the country's opposing groups have reached
close to 50 security-related agreements since 1989. Some of these agreements
were ceasefires, while others were agreements for groups to disarm or come
under the auspices of the Myanmar army as Border Guard Forces or Peoples
Militia Forces.
Some of these
agreements have been sustainable; insofar the groups in question are no longer
in conflict. But often security-based agreements break down when more
comprehensive political agreements aren't reached, as in the case of the 1994
Kachin Independence Army ceasefire.
In other cases,
splinter factions emerge when security agreements don't satisfy the political
goals of all members. This is the case, for example, with the Ta'ang National
Liberation Army , which emerged when some of the Palaung State Liberation
Army's leaders were dissatisfied with the group's 1991 ceasefire agreement and
2005 disarmament. Another example is the Restoration Council of Shan State,
which arose from the Shan United Revolutionary Army's 1996 disarmament.
Agreements such as
the NCA are undeniably an important step in the pathway to peace, insofar as
they can provide a break in the violence, opportunities for confidence
building, and new modalities for negotiation and joint decision-making. But
international experience mirrors Myanmar's own history insofar as security
agreements alone prove insufficient to end fighting in most cases if additional
root causes of conflict are not addressed.
Between 1989-2012,
80 percent of security-focused agreements globally have broken down if
non-security issues were not also addressed. In contrast, more than 80 percent
of comprehensive peace agreements between 1989-2012 — that is. Agreements that
include a wide range of social, economic, political and security issues — have
successfully guarded against a return to violence when they are fully
implemented.
Inclusion
vital to success
Achieving an
inclusive peace process is a third critical challenge that the country now
faces. One dimension of inclusion requires increasing the participation of
women and civil society organisations. This increases the representativeness of
peace processes, encouraging agreements that reflect of the interests of more
people, and garner maximum public buy in to sustain peace agreements through
the implementation phase.
Studies of peace
processes internationally have demonstrated that the inclusion of women in
roles that enable them to have influence increases by 35 percent the likelihood
those resulting peace agreements will last at least 15 years. The inclusion of
civil society organisations, again as genuine participants and not just
bystanders, can reduce the risk of a return to armed conflict by as much as 64
percent.
The second dimension
of increasing inclusion, and a necessity to produce a truly nationwide peace,
requires including most if not all of the groups that are involved in the
fighting. Less than half of the country's ethnic armed organisations are
currently included in the NCA, which represents approximately only 20 percent
of their combined troop numbers. Without the non-signatories, the potential of
the country's political dialog process to achieve a Union Accord will remain
limited.
While this problem
is easy to state, finding potential solutions is much more difficult. The
country's negotiators have been working hard over recent months to find ways of
including non-signatories, but for the most part the necessary compromises have
not materialised, while some groups — notably those that are under intense
military pressure — have questioned whether an alternative to the NCA might be
needed.
International and
Myanmar's own experience suggests that military pressure is counterproductive
to bring non-signatories into a peace process. The question then is what new
strategies or priorities might? What political will and flexibility can
Myanmar's peace process leaders employ to include current non-signatories,
whether inside or alongside the NCA? What effect might improving implementation
of existing agreements have?
From global
experience, higher rates of peace agreement implementation are highly
beneficial to this end. On average, if comprehensive peace agreements are
negotiated and implemented at a rate of 75%, on average 80% of non-signatories
join the process within a year.
The value
of keeping promises
Peace agreements are
not ends in themselves. We often neglect the importance of implementing our
agreements, which is arguably even more difficult than negotiating them. This
trend is currently evident in this country in the continued challenges to
implement NCA provisions related to military codes of conduct, ceasefire
monitoring, and interim arrangements.
Faltering
implementation cannot simply be blamed on a lack of political will. International
experience highlights that vagaries in the text often cause confusion or
otherwise problematise the implementation phase. Capacity limitations, both in
terms of financing and human resources, can limit the ability of some groups to
effectively perform their roles, despite tireless efforts.
Clearly there are no
simple answers to implementation challenges. But the enormous benefits that
high rates of implementation have bought globally may offer encouragement to
prioritise the urgency and timeliness of keeping promises, not just making
them.
Internationally,
agreements that are more fully implemented create a longer lasting peace. Of
the 31 comprehensive peace agreements negotiated globally since 1989, every
additional 1 percent of implementation corresponded to a 6 percent increase in
peace duration. To use more tangible numbers, a peace agreement that was
implemented at 40 percent might last for ten years. The same agreement, if
implemented at 80 percent, would on average prevent a return to armed conflict
for 25 years.
Much is made of the
cost of peace processes, but the economic benefit also deserves attention. On
average, when comprehensive peace agreements are fully implemented, a country's
foreign investment doubles over a decade, while gross domestic product
increases by 5 percent. This translates to more employment opportunities and
improved livelihoods for people.
The benefits to
ordinary people of fully implementing peace agreements also extends to improved
access to education, including on average a 17 percent and 14 percent increase
in primary school enrollment for girls and boys respectively. Improved health
benefits are significant also, including an average 20 percent decline in
infant mortality rates. These livelihood improvements emphasise that
prioritising peace is truly a national priority, not just a process to benefit
the constituencies most affected by conflict, or those groups with the most
grievance about the status quo.
Myanmar's political
conflicts have deep historical roots. Various constitutional proposals and
revisions have attempted to forge mutually agreeable agreements, while numerous
security agreements have sought to pacify armed opposition. This country's
peacemakers have since 2011 already made remarkable progress in in crossing the
threshold to a more sustainable grand political bargain, through compromises,
overcoming ideological differences, and trading group-specific economic and
political privileges for the greater good.
Should this patient
trend continue, while finding ways to overcome immediate challenges of
inclusion and long-term needs for implementation, Myanmar's people have reason
to hope that the world's longest running civil conflict may yet find a
sustainable end.
John Paul Lederach
is a Senior Fellow for Humanity United.
Stephen Gray is a
peace practitioner living and working in Myanmar.
Madhav Joshi is a
Research Associate Professor at the University of Notre Dame and Associate
Director of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies’ Peace Accords
Matrix.