The United Wa State Army’s emergence as a crucial player
in the peace process and its refusal to sign the nationwide ceasefire has left
the government in a difficult position, given the high costs of pursuing
parallel peace processes.
THE RECENT leak of a document outlining the withdrawal of
the Kachin Independence Organization from the United Nationalities Federal
Council has created a paradigm shift in the peace process. The UNFC, which had
taken the leading role as a coalition of seven ethnic armed organisations, may
soon cease to exist. The United Wa State Army, meanwhile, has gone from a
silent actor in the peace process to a crucial one.
Panghsang, the headquarters of the UWSA, has become the
epicentre of a new pathway to peace being pursued by some ethnic armed groups.
Prior to first Union Peace Conference in January 2016, the UWSA convened an
ethnic armed group summit but the political agenda was not clear. The
leadership role of the UWSA emerged in February 2017, after it backed the
coalition of armed groups known as the Northern Alliance - which comprises the
Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army and some brigades from the Kachin Independence Army – and called
for an alternative to the NCA.
The creation of a committee for political dialogue has
affirmed the Wa group’s leading role in the Northern Alliance and as a power
player in the peace process.
Wa unification and the UWSA agenda
Soon after the KIO letter regarding its plan to withdraw
from the UNFC, another UNFC member, the Wa National Organization, decided to
withdraw and accept the invitation to unify with the UWSA. Leaders from the WNO
played a crucial role in encouraging Wa soldiers to rebel against the Communist
Party of Burma in 1989. The group is based along the Thai-Myanmar border and
has not always enjoyed a close relationship with the UWSA. Although this
unification may not significantly affect the combat capability of both parties,
the political message is clear: for the first time there is only one
organisation to represent Wa people. This constitutes a potential revival of Wa
nationalism, strengthening the demand on statehood.
The political motives of the UWSA are still unclear, but
it obvious that they do not favour a peace process based on the NCA. During the
first 21st Century Panglong Union Peace Conference in August-September 2016,
the low-level Wa delegation proposed giving the Wa area state-level status
before walking out of the event due to a dispute over accreditation.
A close ally of the UWSA, the National Democratic
Alliance Army (better known as the Mong La group), also participated in the
Panglong conference. Soon after the event concluded, UWSA troops took control
of a major NDAA outpost in the Mong La area. Although the underlying cause of
this event is never mentioned, it is highly likely that it occurred because of
the Mong La group’s participation and high-level representation at the Panglong
conference.
The UWSA’s recent call for political dialogue with the
Northern Alliance and its formation of the committee for dialogue were somewhat
predictable. More significant is its support for the Chinese government’s Belt
and Road initiative. It shows that the UWSA and Northern Alliance seek
political legitimacy from the Chinese government, or have already been granted
its support.
The continuation and intensification of conflict in
northern and northeastern Shan State has also created divisions within
communities where Kachin, Ta’ang and Shan have lived side by side for
centuries. Forced recruitment, illegal taxation and increased militarisation
within the region has created tensions not only between government troops and
ethnic minority groups, but also between the ethnic minority groups themselves.
The demand for statehood by the UWSA also puts it on a collision course with
the Shan nationalist movement and this may intensify over time.
The future of the UNFC
The organisation is split and its future is unclear. The
New Mon State Party and Karenni National Progressive Party want to continue on
the NCA path but the KIO and Shan State Progress Party are now aligned with the
UWSA-led negotiating committee. This has created questions over the legitimacy
of the UNFC; without the KIA and SSPP, the bloc will be significantly weaker.
During NCA negotiations, inclusivity was the major
concern of non-signatories. With the TNLA, AA and MNDAA barred from
negotiations, UNFC members refused to sign the NCA. However, during the
National League for Democracy administration this policy has changed. The UNFC
has put forward a nine-point proposal – nine demands that must be met for it to
sign the NCA – and the inclusivity of non-UNFC members is now very much a
secondary issue.
The costs of a parallel peace process
The government now faces a situation where it is managing
two peace processes in parallel. The paradigm has shifted from the
Western-supported peace process, which included the NCA, towards
Chinese-influenced dialogue with groups in the north and northeast. Although
the government has initiated dialogue in China, there is no clear indication
that it has opened official talks with the Northern Alliance.
Although implementation of the NCA process is on track
with the support of the United Nations and European Union, China’s role is
still unclear. Bringing the UWSA into the NCA will not be easy, as it conflicts
with Wa and Chinese interests. However, there is a political cost to having
parallel peace processes. Unless there is significant progress on the NCA
process, trust among the ceasefire signatories will decline.
Success in terms of both implementations of the NCA and
dialogue at the Union Peace Conference is the only way to maintain the trust of
ceasefire groups and bring other non-ceasefire groups on board. If that fails
to happen, Myanmar faces a return to the 1990s, with the country divided
between its northern and southern ethnic armed organisations.